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PASHUKANIS AND VYSHINSKY: A STUDY IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF MARXIAN LEGAL THEORY

Lon L. Fuller*
Reading Andrei Y. Vyshinsky's The Law of the Soviet Union1
ought to be a stimulating and rewarding experience. It is an exposition. of Soviet legal philosophy and of the theory and practice of
Soviet public or "state" law. Throughout it purports to compare the
premises that underlie Soviet law with those on which ''bourgeois"
legal systems are based. Vyshinsky, a famous world figure and the
present minister for foreign affairs of the U .S.S.R., wrote part of the
book and supervised compiliation of the remainder. The decision of
the American Council of Learned Societies to sponsor a translation of
the work attests the Council's conception of its importance to Americans seeking to understand modem Russia. According to the introduction by Professor Hazard, the book presents in authoritative form
the doctrine now taught in Soviet law schools. More than that, it
exemplifies "Soviet pedagogical methods" generally, and the habits of
thought that have become characteristic of Soviet citizens. These
methods and habits in tum help to explain, Professor Hazard assures
us, "much of the determination of Soviet soldiers in the war just
ended." Here, in other words, is what makes the Soviet system tick.
With these auspices and this introduction, the reader approaches
the book with high hopes. He expects to gain from it a new understanding of the intellectual and emotional forces operative behind the
Iron Curtain. He hopes further that a real saturation in the premises
of a legal system radically different from that familiar to him will bring
a fresh insight into the meaning of his own system, just as economists
who reject Marxism have enriched their understanding of economics
by studying Marx.
These hopes are, however, doomed to disappointment. The book
dodges every real problem its thesis might seem to suggest and substitutes for reasoned analysis the scurrilous and abusive recriminations
for which its author-editor has become famous in international conferences. As for its contents, the book is made up of the most miscellaneous ingredients, compounded in the greatest disorder. About fifty
per cent of it is taken up with a tedious and unenlightening exposition
of the details of the Soviet political and legal system. Another twenty
per cent is devoted to re6.ghting doctrinal battles within the Marxist
,,. Carter Professor of General Jurisprudence, Harvard Law School-Ed.
general editor. Translated by Hugh Babb. New York: The Macmillan
Co. 1948. Pp. xvii, ?49. $15.
1 Vyshinsky,
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ranks and to nailing down more securely the lids on the coffins of the
"deviationists," "wreckers" and "Trotskyists" who have been liquidated
by the Stalin regime. The remaining thirty per cent is given over to
disclosing the frauds of bourgeois political and legal ideologies. In the
course of this expose some remarkable misinformation is conveyed.
President Truman, for example, would be surprised to learn that in
this country the separation of powers is a fraudulent cover for "the
hegemony of the executive power over the legislative," and that the
President has the unlimited power to prevent any statute from becoming law.
The book contains no genuine comparison of Russian and bourgeois legal and political institutions. Throughout, the object is to
establish the proposition that things which look alike in the capitalist
and Russian systems, and that may even bear the same names-law,
government, the bicameral system, elections, courts, prosecutors, property, legal rights-are in theory and in fact "radically different." In
most cases the difference involved rests more on table-pounding affirmation than on demonstration. The mode in which these questions
are treated is well illustrated in the short section on statutory interpretation. Sprinkled among the usual platitudes on this subject, of
the type one would encounter in any similar American discussion, we
find the assertion that with the Soviet courts statutory interpretation
"merely reveals the meaning and content of the statute," while in
capitalist countries "the class essence of juridical chicanery" distorts
interpretation from its true purpose. They merely draw out of the
statute what it means; we put into it our exploitative biases. So it is
with every other legal device and institution. On the one side, there
is vigor, purity, honesty; on the other, decadence, fraud, cynical exploitation and "putrid vapors." Incredibly enough, this position is
maintained even with respect to civil liberties. According to Vyshinsky
it is only in Russia that there exists "true" freedom of the press, "true"
freedom from illegal searches and seizures, etc., etc.
In studying those parts of the book devoted to quarrels with other
Marxists, particularly the first chapter, the reader who attempts any
close analysis of the thought will experience a considerable malaise.
In this :field, it seems, labels are more important than ideas. The book
opens by rejecting the opportunistic perversion of Marxism which
teaches that the proletariat should "take over" the bourgeois state. On
the other hand, Stalin himself has unmasked "Bukharin's anti-Marxist,
counterrevolutionary theory of 'blowing up' the state." The true doctrine is that the state must not be "taken over" or ''blown up," but
·
d must b e "sh attered" an d "demo1·ISh ed ." Tu·.IS turns out to
rnstea
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mean, about sixty pages later, that the existing bourgeois machine of
the state must be "utilized" and, over a period of years, purged of its
bourgeois elements.
When one has struggled through demonstrations of this sort, trying
vainly to see just what it is that is being rejected and what accepted,
one recalls with bewilderment Professor Hazard's introduction, in
which it is asserted that the Soviet student "who reasons his way
through the ponderous passages of this and similar works" has prepared
himself to deal with Western thought. I submit that anyone who
seriously attempted "to reason his way" through this first chapter would
have prepared himself for nothing so much as a nervous breakdown.
These, then, are the disappointments and frustrations that the
book brings for one who attempts to derive something of intellectual
substance from its contents. But for all its vacuity, its abusiveness, and
its platitudes, the book remains a significant milestone in the development of attitudes toward law and government within the Soviet system.
What meaning or lesson can we extract from it? I think the best way
to approach this question is to begin by comparing the book with what
it superseded. Before the ascendancy of Vyshinsky, the leading jurist
of Russia was Eugene Pashukanis, who enjoyed a decade of glory prior
to his mysterious disappearance in the early months of 1937.
Pashukanis' principal work is called General Legal Theory and
Marxism. 2 In this short book, Pashukanis expounds with clarity and
coherence an ingenious development of Marxist theory that has been
called the "Commodity Exchange Theory of Law." His work is in
the best tradition of Marxism. It is the product of thorough scholarship and wide reading. It reaches conclusions that will seem to most
readers perverse and bizarre, yet in the process of reaching these conclusions it brings familiar facts of law and government into an unfamiliar but revealing perspective. It is the kind of book that any
open-minded scholar can read vvith real profit, however little he may
be convinced by its main thesis.
Pashukanis' legal theory is founded on two principles well-established in the writings of the Soviet founding fathers: (I) law and the
state are a superstructure reflecting the basic economic organization of
society, and (2) in the socialist economy of the future, both law and
the state will "wither away."
Proceeding from these premises, Pashukanis then expounds his
own theory, which is briefly as follows: the basic institution of capital2 Being unable to read Russian, I am familiar with this book through the German
translation of the third Russian edition, which appeared :in 1929 under the title Au.GBMEINB RBmrrsLBHRB tJND MAloo:sMtJs. An English translation by Professor Babb is
now awaiting publication.

1160

MICHIGAN

LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 47

ism is exchange; all goods (including labor) are viewed as "commodities," that is, as destined for exchange on the market. In keeping with
Marxist theory, therefore, we should expect bourgeois law to be permeated with the concept of exchange, and to take its origin in the
act of trading or bartering.
~
This expectation is confirmed by history and sociology. The :6.rst
appearance of the criminal law in its rudest form is in connection
with bartering, that is, in the buying off of the blood feud. 3 Throughout history the development of law has gone hand in hand with the
development of trade.
Most definitions of law mistakenly try to make it equivalent to
an authoritative ordering of social relations, but this does not expose
its real essence. The ideal type of an authoritative ordering would be
a military company marching in perfect step, ready to follow every
command of its captain. Yet such a phenomenon is not only not legal
in nature, but actually stands at the opposite pole from law. This is
true generally of mere relationships of power. Slavery, for example,
requires no legal form. If the relation of master and slave is in any
sense legal, it is only because the master can exchange the slave for
other goods, or because the law recognizes some semblance of a right
in the slave against the master. Law appears as a distinct social phenomenon not when we have one man standing over another, but only
when we have men standing toward one another with rights and
duties.
The basic concept of law is, then, the legal subject, the possessor
of rights and duties. The legal subject is, however, merely the economic trader seen in his juristic aspect. Take from the legal subject
the power to settle or compromise his differences with his fellows by
a process of barter and he ceases to be a legal subject. Legal rights
wholly removed from the area of trade are not legal rights at all. Every
legal subject is therefore a potential trader, and his capacity to possess
rights and duties and to enter legal relations with others derives from
this fact. The economic institution of exchange is accordingly presupposed in the conception of a legal right. The whole legal order,
in turn, has its reason for being in the vindication of rights. The
modem notion that the individual derives his rights from the law or
from the state is the symptom of a decadent capitalism. When capitalism was itself a revolutionary force it was universally thought that
law exists to protect rights, that·rights precede law.
s The theory of a great anthropologist concerning the origin of law in primitive society
presents a surprising parallel to Pashukanis' conception. Malinowski in effect sees law becoming a distinct social phenomenon when reciprocity becomes explicit and formalized:
CRIMB AND CusToM IN SAVAGE SocmTY 58 (1926).
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In modem criminal law, a £.rst cousin of economic exchange
appears in the notion of retribution. The criminal code is a kind of
schedule of compositions, setting the price (in terms of punishment)
appropriate for each crime. According to the principle of nulla poena
sine lege the criminal must be given a chance to know in advance what
the price of each kind of misconduct is. Advanced bourgeois criminologists have long condemned these conceptions as irrational. They
continue, however, to be entertained by the bulk of society and .to be
applied by the courts. When the public follows a criminal trial in the
newspapers it is not interested in learning whether the criminal can
be rehabilitated, or whether he is maladjusted to social life, but
whether he actually did what he is accused of doing and whether he
is going to get what is corning to him. The attitudes engendered by
an economy founded on exchange are too deeply rooted to be destroyed
by learned treatises.
Though in bourgeois society, law is an instrument of domination
by the ruling classes, it is so only in an indirect sense. To say that
law is a means of domination or exploitation fails to reveal its essence.
The domination of one class by another can,exist without law, where,
for example, it is founded on religious superstition or military power.
The exploitation of the proletariat by the capitalist takes a special
and peculiar form. On its economic side, it is primarily through the
market; on the legal side, it is through the notion that the worker sets
his legal relations with his employer through contract. It is an exploitation through exchange, and, in keeping with the Marxian theory of
the primacy of the economic form, its essential nature is determined by
this fact.
This analysis of law is not simply an analysis of bourgeois law, but
of law generally. In truth, the only law is bourgeois law. To be sure,
legal institutions in embryo can be found in a feudal or slave society,
where they are intertwined with religious and military elements.
Modem scholars are likely to misinterpret these rudimentary legal
elements in pre-capitalistic society as the equivalent of modem law.
Actually, these embryonic and undifferentiated legal elements are like
the first tentative gropings toward a capitalistic organization that can
be detected in even the most primitive societies. The full inner logic
of the conception of law can assert itself only under capitalism. The
ideal of law is realized at the same time as the ideal of the market;
both present man as the trader, as an autonomous agent setting his
relations with his fellows.
Not only is law founded on the concept of exchange, but the same
thing may be said of morality. Morality has to do with conflicts of
interests between individuals who are conceived to have it within their

1162

MICHIGAN

LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 47

power to determine what they shall do or not do toward one another.
Such individuals are simply economic traders seen in the light of
ethics. Moral treatises lay down a kind of minimum standard of
conduct designed to maintain the principle of reciprocity. They do
not answer such questions as whether a man should volunteer on a
suicide mission; acts of heroism or of extraordinary devotion to the
group fall outside the competence of ethical philosophy. Kant's conception that every man should be treated as an end in himself, as a
Selbstzweck, implies a trading economy. Only in such an economy
can a man who is conceived to be an end in himself be brought,
through self-interest, to serve the ends of others-a result essential if
any collective activity is to be achieved.
From these premises it follows that law and morality will disappear
when, and only when, the last vestiges of the economic institution of
exchange have been rooted out of society. The Soviet system still
contains important elements of exchange. These exist not only in the
area set aside for private trading, but in the relations of government
corporations to one another, and in the payment of workers, who are
compensated on the basis of work performed, in violation of the formula of mature communism, "From each according to his capacities,
to each according to his needs."
On the other hand, when the notion of economic exchange has
been completely eliminated in every form, then-with some allowance
for a lag in time-the superstructure of law, the state, and morality
will dissolve and disappear. Man will have become a "group-creature,"
no longer thinking of his own interest as something distinct from that
of his fellows. The concept of justice and the notion of demanding
measure for measure will have become as inapplicable to this situation
as they now are, say, to a mother and child between whom there is
a complete identity of interest.
This is, then, in summary, the legal philosophy of Eugene Pashukanis. It is ostensibly because he held this philosophy that Pashukanis
was first forced to make an ineffective recantation and was later erased
from the Soviet scene, to make way for Andrei Vyshinski, who began
publishing the materials of The Law of the Soviet State shortly thereafter. "Reasoning their way through" this work, Soviet students now
· was "a wrecker,""a spy,""a traitor,
· " an dh
as u ams
t e
1earn that Phk
"
propounder of a "rotten t h
eory.
With all this vituperation one asks naturally, just what is the
difference between the theories of the discredited and liquidated Pashukanis and those of the now triumphant Vyshinsky? This question is
much harder to answer than might be supposed. Indeed, when one
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first puts Vyshinsky's book down, one is apt to believe it cannot be
answered. We seem to have before us, not a development from one
system of thought to another, but a deterioration of Marxist doctrine
that has brought it to such a level of vacuity that comparisons cease
to be possible. Yet, on reHection, certain crucial points of distinction
do emerge between the two writers. Their principal differences seem
to be the following:
First. Both writers in form accept the orthodox communist view
that law and the state will ultimately "wither away." Even for Vyshinsky, although the present Soviet order is "perfect and complete
socialism," it is a step toward an eventual communism. Judged by the
standards of that final goal, present Soviet methods of wage payment
are, Vyshinsky concedes, "unjust," since they compensate a man for
what he does instead of giving him what he needs. (It may be remarked that even if Vyshinsky did not agree with this conception,
it would have been imposed on him, not only by a long tradition of
Marxist thought, but by the Stalin Constitution itself, the glories of
which his book celebrates.) Though Pashukanis was somewhat vague
as to just how near at hand the withering process was, he was fairly
clear as to the conditions under which it would occur. In accordance
with the Marxian theory of the primacy of economic factors, the
withering would occur when, and only when, the element of exchange
or reciprocity of performances was rooted out of the Soviet economic
system. For Vyshinsky, on the other hand, the disappearance of state
and law cannot occur until men have been so trained and conditioned
that they will follow, without the need for coercion, the rules necessary
to social order. He implies that this transformation of man's nature
is a long way off; the withering will be a very slow process. Some
uneasiness about the consistency of this view with the inherited doctrine may be betrayed in the emphasis Vyshinsky gives to Stalin's
dictum that Russia must embrace "creative Marxism," not "dogmatic
Marxism."
Second. Pashukanis was clear and emphatic in asserting that as
long as you have exchange you "\\rill have law, and as long as you have
law it will be bourgeois law. There is no use pretending that socialist
law is something of a higher nature, or different from capitalist law;
to think otherwise is to engage in self-deception. This is, however,
exactly the self-deception which takes up a large part of Vyshinsky's
book. The law of the Soviet Union is in every way bigger, better and
purer than bourgeois law. Strangely, the effort is repeatedly made to
demonstrate that Soviet law is superior in terms of the premises underlying bourgeois law; it really does the things bourgeois law pretends
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to do. This is a new note, completely out of tune with the implications
of Pashukanis' theory.
Third. There is no suggestion in Vyshinsky's book that morality,
in the sense of some standard regulating the relation of man to man,
will ultimately disappear along with law and the state. On the
contrary, only when morality has become so strong that men will obey
its rules without constraint can law wither away.
Fourth. Vyshinsky, for all his excoriation of Pashukanis, makes
a very careful detour around the central thesis of Pashukanis' book:
the relation of law and the economic concept of exchange or reciprocity. In one all-too-obvious case, that is, in the matter of wage payments, he has to concede that the present system has not achieved the
ultimate goal of Marxism. He makes little mention, however, of the
exchange elements involved in the trading that goes on among government corporations, and lays down no program (as did Pashukanis)
for the elimination of this socialistic "market." At one point he even
praises "contract discipline" as a needed supplement to central economic planning.
Fifth. The orthodox communist conception regards law as the
expression of the will of the ruling class. It was with respect to this
conception that Pashukanis was most bold in his deviation from accepted doctrine. He insisted that this view of law was only a kind
of truism, which failed to reveal the real essence of legal phenomena,
since it was incapable of explaining how something called "law" could
reinforce or sanctify the brute fact of domination. The orthodox
conception is, at least in form, reinstated in Vyshinsky's book, where
the difficulties raised by Pashukanis are simply passed over in silence.
Pure, fine and noble as it is, the Soviet law of today is "the totality
of the rules of conduct expressing the will of the dominant class" and
it is designed to promote those relationships that are "advantageous
and agreeable to the dominant class." Yet Vyshinsky does not himself
seem very much at ease with this definition, and he makes tentatives
in the direction of identifying "the dominant class" with the community as a whole, even though it is admitted that Soviet society
has not as yet become classless. At any rate, the extravagant claims
he makes for Soviet law really go further than anything Pashukanis
wrote toward relegating to the attic of discarded doctrine the notion
that law, even in a socialist economy, is simply an instrument of
power. If it is this, it is so much in addition according to Vyshinsky's professions that the old conception has really lost its meaning.
The causes that have produced the shifts in doctrine outlined
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above are not, I think, obscure. In the process of attempting to operate a great governmental machine, the Soviet leaders have rediscovered
some ancient truths. They have learned that the state without justice
is impossible, or at least that it is impossible unless people believe that
the state is attempting in some degree to render to each his due. They
have also seen that some respect must be paid, sooner or later, to the
principal of legality; men must know, or think they know, where they
stand under the law and before the courts. The despised bourgeois
virtues turn out, in the end, not to be mere copybook maxims, but
indispensable ways of getting things done, rooted in the very nature
of the human animal.
This was a discovery for which the Soviet leaders were poorly prepared by Marxist doctrine. That doctrine gives no explicit guidance
in conducting the transition from revolutionary terror to stability and
legality, and such implicit guidance as can be deduced from it is
fantastically wrong. The molders of the Soviet state found themselves
caught with an untenable and unworkable theory. Instead of being
able to purge their system gradually of all bourgeois conceptions, they
found themselves under a compulsion to employ progressively the
same procedures and institutions that had been found essential to
social stability in bourgeois society. It was necessary to cover a major
intellectual retreat; the time had come when some beclouding of
doctrine was necessary as a face-saving operation. This was no assignment for a studious theoretician like Pashukanis. It demanded the
thundering obfuscations of an old court-room performer like Vyshinsky.
On this basis we may explain not only the erasure of a whole
chapter of Soviet legal philosophy, but also why it was necessary to
find a new man to expound the party line in matters jurisprudential.
As my colleague Harold Berman has suggested,4 we may in the same
way also explain some of the most offensive features of Vyshinsky's
style. When you are caught in a position where you dare not argue,
billingsgate has its uses. In a ~ountry ostensibly ruled by a dogma,
silence is not only embarrassing; it can be positively dangerous.
On this reading,The Law of the Soviet State, which at first visits
on its reader only an acute intellectual nausea, turns out to contain
an important message of hope. The hard line of Marxism can bend
before the compulsions of life. If it can bend to the extent of permitting
the Soviet system itself to live, it may perhaps bend enough to save
humanity from an Armageddon. If the theory that all law is capitalist
4

97 Umv. PA. L. REv. 593 (1949).
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law can £nd its way to the ash heap, the same thing can happen
to the theory of an inevitable conllict between capitalism and communism-no matter how many times this theory may have been
affirmed in the writings of the prophets.
. I believe that one of the greatest dangers now confronting us
is that we will become more Marxist than the Marxists themselves
in interpreting the motives and future conduct of Russia. One of the
sad necessities imposed by modem government is that many different
organizations must be controlled by a single "policy" dictated from
above. Our occupying forces and our State Department must act
according to some coherant, general plan. Such a plan cannot be
changed from day to day if the work of many individuals is to be
coordinated and their morale preserved. Yet the formulation of such
a plan depends in large measure on a prediction of the future behavior
of those with whom we must deal. We have to make this prediction
knowing that it really lies beyond our powers. If our best experts are
incapable of predicting the actions of our own electorate, it is folly
to suppose that we can anticipate the future aims of the Politburo.
The perplexities of this situation are such that the easiest way
out is likely to seem the only way out. The temptation is overwhelming to take the clues for our own conduct from the taught doctrine
of communism. Our experts in the State Department are commissioned, in effect, to lay a slide-rule on the ,..vritings of Marx, Lenin
and Stalin, and to come up with the Answer. This is a very hazardous
procedure, which, if taken too seriously, can become disastrous.
In our present predicament, we need above all else to keep some
sense of contingency, some feeling for the pressures that lie behind
the printed page, some awareness of the complexity and the possible
internal contradictions in the motives of our potential enemy. We
must have the intellectual forbearance to let time and nature work
on our side; we must not be like the farmer in the Chinese proverb
who pulled his crops out by the roots trying, as he explained, "to help
them grow."5
Meanwhile, of course, we should keep our powder dry and plentiful, and we should not be distracted from our goal of peace by the
abusive epithets of a Vyshinsky, who is, after all, playing a game at
home into which we are at best imperfectly initiated.
5 The eloquent appeal for this point of view made by the former director of the laboratory that developed the atomic bomb should be required reading for all of our "policymakers." See Oppenheimer, "The Open Mind," ATLANTIC 28 (Feb. 1949). Perhaps two
readings of this article ought to be recommended, for its thought is much too profound and
subtle to be absorbed in a single reading.

